We are in the heart of budget season, and a particularly contentious one at that. This of course leads to the inevitable discussion about taxes. When times are rough, we should be focused on removing the portion of income that government takes from individuals. I don’t care who you ask; the $2730 per person ($819B/300M) the government is prepared to spend could be put to better use by the individuals from whom it is being taken. I, for example, could afford to buy my casebooks for this whole school year and pay a month of rent. People would put money into the industries that really need it: retail, banking, real estate, automobiles, etc.
But I digress. My post today isn’t about the financial wisdom of the bailout bill. It’s about our system of taxes.
I, of course, truly morally oppose income taxation. But for the sake of discussion, I won’t propose abolishing the income tax at all. I’m just going to propose a way to achieve our stated goals.
In my Income Tax class, we pointed out that there are three principles to which the tax code tries to adhere. Progressivity, or vertical equity is one (why they use the word “equity” for an inherent inequality is beyond me). The second is horizontal equity between individuals or married units. Third is neutrality between remaining single and getting married.
This discussion is based on the terms “marriage penalty” or “marriage bonus.” The idea here is that persons may have an economic incentive or disincentive to get married or work once married. The marriage penalty occurs when two individuals of roughly equal income get married. Individually, they would be in one income bracket (say 15%), so if they file independently, they would pay a total of 15% in taxes. However, their combined income pushes them into a higher tax bracket, perhaps 20%. Just for getting married, there is a 5% penalty.
Before we go on, yes, I realize I am simplifying this and not including a broad number of things, including progressive marginal tax rates and tax credits. I’ll come back to that momentarily.
As you can see, in our current system, we can achieve the first two principles, but fail on the third. We are not neutral between being single and being married. But at least we have achieved progressivity and horizontal equity.
Lawmakers often talk of “eliminating the marriage penalty”. The way they do this, as the Bush tax reforms attempted to do, is to adjust the width of brackets and play with tax credits and deductions. That may achieve near neutrality, but it screwed up the second principle. Now we treat married units who file individually different than married units who file jointly.
The truth is, there is no way to achieve both horizontal equity and neutrality between married persons and single persons. At least, not by staying in the tax system that we have had for the last hundred years. The more you try to create neutrality, the less equal you make the system. Like a balloon, you squeeze one and expand somewhere else.
My cynical nature says that politicians want it this way. First, they can all stump on removing the marriage penalty, thus sounding like people with good family values. But they don’t fix it wisely. They try to achieve their goals by adding other deductions and credits, further complicating the tax code. And as we all know, it’s so confusing right now that even the people writing the tax code (I’m talking to you, Barney Frank) and other politicians (you too Daschle, Killefer, and Geithner) can’t figure it out.
Of course, there is one way to simplify the tax code while still achieving equity and neutrality. Of course, it’s the one that few politicians actually talk about. Why not tinker with the first principle: progressivity? After all, whereas equity and neutrality should be goals of every good government, progressivity isn’t exactly something about which people revolt. “Darn you, George III, why won’t you tax rich people at higher rates than me?!?!”
Let’s assume that you have a flat tax of 10%. If people combine their incomes at marriage, they still will pay only 10%. If you decide to stay single, you still only pay 10%. If that couple over there pays 10%, this couple over here will pay 10% too. We have achieved equity and neutrality while sacrificing only this antiquated notion of progressive rate structures. 10% is 10%, no matter who you are or how much you earn. Even Tim Geithner could figure that one out.
Yes, there could still be tax credits that would have the effect of a progressive tax code. The EITC and Child Tax Credit could still exist. Poor people could still get perks in the tax code that just aren’t available to the wealthy. But at least we could say we are trying to be equal while still doing something about it.
Of course, such a system would require the government to spend less. I could talk about that for months. But I won’t. Government should have to spend less. But whether you agree with me on that point or not, I hope we can see eye-to-eye on a flat tax and eliminating the prejudicial, archaic, biased progressive tax system.
One of my friends once tried to defend the progressive tax system by using a logical fallacy. “Progressive means moving forward, achieving progress. You don’t want to be moving backwards do you?” Fallacy aside, the progressive tax doesn’t move us forward or achieve progress. It means that people are treated differently based on their income. Just because it’s the reverse of what most people think of as income discrimination doesn’t mean it’s any less invidious. Reverse-racism is just as bad as racism. We should focus on treating all Americans equally before the law.
After all, that’s what we were founded on.
Showing posts with label General Law. Show all posts
Showing posts with label General Law. Show all posts
9.22.2008
Election 2008: Texas Turns... Yellow?
As some will know, I am a pretty big supporter of third-party rights in this country, believing that both of the two major parties are in need of some serious revision. So I was delighted to hear about a suit filed in Texas by Libertarian Party candidate Bob Barr, contesting the presence of John McCain and Barack Obama on the ballots in November.
According to the campaign's press release:
It's true that too often, the two major parties break election rules and allowed to get away with it because both parties violated them. Essentially, why would McCain complain about Obama breaking a law, when he knows that Obama will do the same thing right back to him? This is an example of why multiple parties keep the election process [more] honest. Smaller parties are forced to know the election laws forwards and backwards, because they have to follow every letter to survive the attacks the major parties put on them (see, for example, the removal of Barr from the West Virginia and Connecticut ballots).
Other states have kicked Barr and others off the ballot because they did not meet filing deadlines. If it's fair to remove candidates for failing to meet deadlines when they represent minor parties, then turnabout should be fair play. If I were a resident of Texas (or any other state that placed their deadline earlier than August 27, the day the Democrats officially declared Obama their candidate), I would be tremendously offended that the major parties thought they were more important than my state's laws.
Of course the point of deadlines so early is to make certification for minor parties extremely difficult. But if the major parties are too cocky to read the rules of every state, then the Secretaries of State for the various states should boot the punks off their ballot and let parties that know how to read appear on the ballot.
Of course I'm not hopeful for the success of this lawsuit. The judges in Texas are elected on a partisan basis, so they owe a debt to their parties. And when it gets appealed up, the judges were all appointed by partisan elected officials, so they still owe a debt. Not quite fair, I know, but it would be nice if judges would simply read the law and apply it equally in all cases. Either they filed by August 26 or they didn't. Risk getting kicked off the bench to do the right thing.
But as we all know, "...some are more equal than others."
According to the campaign's press release:
"The seriousness of this issue is self-evident," the lawsuit states. "The hubris of the major parties has risen to such a level that they do not believe that the election laws of the State of Texas apply to them."
Texas election code §192.031 requires that the “written certification” of the “party’s nominees” be delivered “before 5 p.m. of the 70th day before election day.” Because neither candidate had been nominated by the official filing deadline, the Barr campaign argues it was impossible for the candidates to file under state law.
"Supreme Court justices should recognize that their responsibility is to apply the law as passed by the Legislature, and the law is clear that the candidates cannot be certified on the ballot if their filings are late," says Drew Shirley, a local attorney for the Barr campaign, who is also a Libertarian candidate for the Texas Supreme Court.
A 2006 Texas Supreme Court decision ruled that state law "does not allow political parties or candidates to ignore statutory deadlines."
It's true that too often, the two major parties break election rules and allowed to get away with it because both parties violated them. Essentially, why would McCain complain about Obama breaking a law, when he knows that Obama will do the same thing right back to him? This is an example of why multiple parties keep the election process [more] honest. Smaller parties are forced to know the election laws forwards and backwards, because they have to follow every letter to survive the attacks the major parties put on them (see, for example, the removal of Barr from the West Virginia and Connecticut ballots).
Other states have kicked Barr and others off the ballot because they did not meet filing deadlines. If it's fair to remove candidates for failing to meet deadlines when they represent minor parties, then turnabout should be fair play. If I were a resident of Texas (or any other state that placed their deadline earlier than August 27, the day the Democrats officially declared Obama their candidate), I would be tremendously offended that the major parties thought they were more important than my state's laws.
Of course the point of deadlines so early is to make certification for minor parties extremely difficult. But if the major parties are too cocky to read the rules of every state, then the Secretaries of State for the various states should boot the punks off their ballot and let parties that know how to read appear on the ballot.
Of course I'm not hopeful for the success of this lawsuit. The judges in Texas are elected on a partisan basis, so they owe a debt to their parties. And when it gets appealed up, the judges were all appointed by partisan elected officials, so they still owe a debt. Not quite fair, I know, but it would be nice if judges would simply read the law and apply it equally in all cases. Either they filed by August 26 or they didn't. Risk getting kicked off the bench to do the right thing.
But as we all know, "...some are more equal than others."
Public Understanding of Bankruptcy Law
I'm deep into this semester, and my schedule is quite heavy. In addition to coursework in Constitutional Law, Criminal Procedure, Secured Transactions, Federal Criminal Law, and Evidence, I am in the depths of Moot Court (and that is all I'm allowed to say about Moot Court, apparently) as well as representing the student body as a member of the Indiana University Student Association. That would explain why I haven't blogged since I got back from the ABA Annual Meeting in New York (which, incidentally, was one of the most enjoyable law-related activities I have yet to participate in).
There is no doubt that the press sometimes picks up stories about the law and frames them in the context of "Judge is evil for enforcing law X". Sometimes I agree; the law in question is sometimes abhorrent and should be overturned on Constitutional grounds. Even better, here in Indiana, let a jury find that the law is something other than it seems to be. But other times, the press is making something sound horrible without considering anything in the world of the law.
Today the AP picked up a story about a bankruptcy court ordering a victim to pay back a thief. The story begins:
Apparently, the builder stole a lot of money from Mr. Poveromo. Then, two months before being convicted, the thief declared bankruptcy because, well, he was bankrupt. The thief paid off a large portion of the stolen property. Then the bankruptcy judge took it back because, as we all know, Article 9 of the U.C.C. says unsecured creditors are on the bottom of the totem pole (nevermind that the reporter never mentions the law behind this judge's reasoning... just make the judge out to be a jerk).
Now, a few months ago I may have thought to myself that this is completely unfair; a miscarriage of justice! But I've taken a few weeks of Secured Transactions now, and, unlike the general populace, I won't fall for this reporter's trickery.
The story advocates altering the bankruptcy code to allow victims of crimes to essentially become secured creditors after their judgment. As the law exists now, as Mr. Poveromo puts it, "Crime does pay." Obviously, this would be a hard law to write. Why limit the law to protect only victims of crime? If your legislative intent is to protect victims, shouldn't every victorious plaintiff in a tort claim be granted this secured status? And what makes a victim more important than a commercial lender? After all, if a new class of secured parties suddenly appears, lenders will be less likely to grant loans (because they will be in a worse position), or at least will demand higher interest rates to compensate them for the additional risk.
Do I feel bad for victims who, unfortunately, don't get the protections of Article 9? Sure. They've been wronged, and they deserve restitution. But why should we put them above commercial lenders, or anyone that was wise enough to get a security agreement? Mr. Poveromo's lawyer should have done enough research to know that the thief had filed for bankruptcy.
Of course, my biggest complaint here is the reporter who covered this story. He should have at least put the judge's reasoning in the article instead of making judges out to be evil dictators taking money from victims to compensate thieves (or, as one law professor was quoted, making "outrageous decision[s]" and executing a "miscarriage of justice"). If the populace feels judges are acting improperly, the press is certainly responsible for leading them in that direction.
There is no doubt that the press sometimes picks up stories about the law and frames them in the context of "Judge is evil for enforcing law X". Sometimes I agree; the law in question is sometimes abhorrent and should be overturned on Constitutional grounds. Even better, here in Indiana, let a jury find that the law is something other than it seems to be. But other times, the press is making something sound horrible without considering anything in the world of the law.
Today the AP picked up a story about a bankruptcy court ordering a victim to pay back a thief. The story begins:
Mark Poveromo feels ripped off twice over. A judge ordered him to repay money he collected from a builder convicted of stealing from him — and told him to kick in the thief's attorney fees and court costs, too.
Some legal experts say the case, in which a criminal case in Connecticut intersects a bankruptcy judgment filed in St. Louis, shows a need for Congress to revise the nation's bankruptcy laws to better treat people who are awarded money as part of ruling in a criminal case.
Apparently, the builder stole a lot of money from Mr. Poveromo. Then, two months before being convicted, the thief declared bankruptcy because, well, he was bankrupt. The thief paid off a large portion of the stolen property. Then the bankruptcy judge took it back because, as we all know, Article 9 of the U.C.C. says unsecured creditors are on the bottom of the totem pole (nevermind that the reporter never mentions the law behind this judge's reasoning... just make the judge out to be a jerk).
Now, a few months ago I may have thought to myself that this is completely unfair; a miscarriage of justice! But I've taken a few weeks of Secured Transactions now, and, unlike the general populace, I won't fall for this reporter's trickery.
The story advocates altering the bankruptcy code to allow victims of crimes to essentially become secured creditors after their judgment. As the law exists now, as Mr. Poveromo puts it, "Crime does pay." Obviously, this would be a hard law to write. Why limit the law to protect only victims of crime? If your legislative intent is to protect victims, shouldn't every victorious plaintiff in a tort claim be granted this secured status? And what makes a victim more important than a commercial lender? After all, if a new class of secured parties suddenly appears, lenders will be less likely to grant loans (because they will be in a worse position), or at least will demand higher interest rates to compensate them for the additional risk.
Do I feel bad for victims who, unfortunately, don't get the protections of Article 9? Sure. They've been wronged, and they deserve restitution. But why should we put them above commercial lenders, or anyone that was wise enough to get a security agreement? Mr. Poveromo's lawyer should have done enough research to know that the thief had filed for bankruptcy.
Of course, my biggest complaint here is the reporter who covered this story. He should have at least put the judge's reasoning in the article instead of making judges out to be evil dictators taking money from victims to compensate thieves (or, as one law professor was quoted, making "outrageous decision[s]" and executing a "miscarriage of justice"). If the populace feels judges are acting improperly, the press is certainly responsible for leading them in that direction.
7.11.2008
More on: The Real Reason for Number Two
Kyle Michael at KMitB was kind enough to post a response to my previous post praising the Heller decision. Always in the mood for a good discussion, I want to respond to his response.
Michael writes:
You may have noticed that you don’t see many good militias these days; I suspect they’re hard to get together. Blair sticks to his guns (so to speak) here, maintaining that this is still a relevant purpose. That’s fine, if silly, but it fails to account for the use of guns for other purposes. Where does hunting fit in? Or, for that matter, why should you be allowed to use a gun to defend yourself against any threat other than an “oppressive government” or an invasion? The 2nd Amendment doesn’t mention anything about any of this; you’d think Scalia would have a problem with that.
I should first point out that I don't believe that the Second Amendment exists solely for the purpose of protection from an oppressive government. While that may be its most important purpose, there are certainly others - anything from self-defense to sport hunting. The language of the Amendment doesn't even mention invasion or self-defense.
Presumably, Michael is making the ill-fated grammar-based interpretation of the Second Amendment, that suggests that the preamble of the Amendment (i.e. "A well regulated militia, being necessary to the security of a Free state,") means that it applies only to organized militias and the security of the state. George Mason law professor Nelson Lund destroyed this position in his amicus brief in Heller. One need only examine other documents from the same time period to know that writing preambles was the fad, and that those preambles are not all-inclusive.
For example, one can look at Article 3 of the Northwest Ordinance ("Religion, morality, and knowledge, being necessary to good government and the happiness of mankind, schools and the means of education shall forever be encouraged"). I doubt many people will argue that the only reason we encourage schools in this nation is because education makes for good government and happiness, or that religion, morality, and knowledge are their only purpose. Sure, those are pretty good reasons, but they are not the only reasons.
Michael continues:
Like Blair, Scalia combines the 2nd Amendment with a common law right to self defense. In doing so, and in endorsing the dipshit view that keeping handguns in the home for self-defense is a good idea, Scalia writes (and I swear I am not making this up): "[a handgun] can be pointed at a burglar with one hand while the other hand dials the police."
The Cato Institute's amicus brief in Heller discusses the English roots of the right to bear arms, which does cover the fact that the common law right to bear arms is derived from, and must be understood with, the common law right to self-defense. The English Bill of Rights of 1689 supports it, as does Blackstone and a variety of other English sources. Whether it is a "good idea" is a separate matter. Michael falls back on tired rhetoric to argue that kids will find the gun and do harm with it. Even if you take that position and do intelligent things, like putting the gun away and teaching kids about gun responsibilities from a young age, the point is irrelevant. The Second Amendment doesn't cover stupid parents; it covers a right that cannot be taken away from an individual.
I do, however, agree with Michael about one point. Justice Scalia's reliance on the notion that I will call the police while holding a gun is a poor choice in his opinion. I will shoot first with both hands (as you're taught to do in firing ranges), then call the police with both hands.
Michael writes:
You may have noticed that you don’t see many good militias these days; I suspect they’re hard to get together. Blair sticks to his guns (so to speak) here, maintaining that this is still a relevant purpose. That’s fine, if silly, but it fails to account for the use of guns for other purposes. Where does hunting fit in? Or, for that matter, why should you be allowed to use a gun to defend yourself against any threat other than an “oppressive government” or an invasion? The 2nd Amendment doesn’t mention anything about any of this; you’d think Scalia would have a problem with that.
I should first point out that I don't believe that the Second Amendment exists solely for the purpose of protection from an oppressive government. While that may be its most important purpose, there are certainly others - anything from self-defense to sport hunting. The language of the Amendment doesn't even mention invasion or self-defense.
Presumably, Michael is making the ill-fated grammar-based interpretation of the Second Amendment, that suggests that the preamble of the Amendment (i.e. "A well regulated militia, being necessary to the security of a Free state,") means that it applies only to organized militias and the security of the state. George Mason law professor Nelson Lund destroyed this position in his amicus brief in Heller. One need only examine other documents from the same time period to know that writing preambles was the fad, and that those preambles are not all-inclusive.
For example, one can look at Article 3 of the Northwest Ordinance ("Religion, morality, and knowledge, being necessary to good government and the happiness of mankind, schools and the means of education shall forever be encouraged"). I doubt many people will argue that the only reason we encourage schools in this nation is because education makes for good government and happiness, or that religion, morality, and knowledge are their only purpose. Sure, those are pretty good reasons, but they are not the only reasons.
Michael continues:
Like Blair, Scalia combines the 2nd Amendment with a common law right to self defense. In doing so, and in endorsing the dipshit view that keeping handguns in the home for self-defense is a good idea, Scalia writes (and I swear I am not making this up): "[a handgun] can be pointed at a burglar with one hand while the other hand dials the police."
The Cato Institute's amicus brief in Heller discusses the English roots of the right to bear arms, which does cover the fact that the common law right to bear arms is derived from, and must be understood with, the common law right to self-defense. The English Bill of Rights of 1689 supports it, as does Blackstone and a variety of other English sources. Whether it is a "good idea" is a separate matter. Michael falls back on tired rhetoric to argue that kids will find the gun and do harm with it. Even if you take that position and do intelligent things, like putting the gun away and teaching kids about gun responsibilities from a young age, the point is irrelevant. The Second Amendment doesn't cover stupid parents; it covers a right that cannot be taken away from an individual.
I do, however, agree with Michael about one point. Justice Scalia's reliance on the notion that I will call the police while holding a gun is a poor choice in his opinion. I will shoot first with both hands (as you're taught to do in firing ranges), then call the police with both hands.
3.13.2008
Two Tidbits from the News
I know it's been a while since I posted, mostly because of Spring Break and a variety of other scheduling conflicts. But two tidbits from the news really caught my eye and I think that they are worth mentioning here.
Today's Indianapolis Star reports that Governor Daniels has used his first veto of this session, something he has done only seven times in office. I must say, he saved it for a good one. The bill: HEA 1210. The premise of the bill: allow a loophole for individuals who do not pass the teacher's licensing exam to still become teachers in Indiana. Easily one of the dumbest bills passed by the General Assembly this session.
Now, as anyone who has been reading this blog for a long time can tell you, I am no fan of public education. But if you're going to have public education, then it would best for your teachers to have some sort of standard. This bill would have allowed persons who fail the test to become teachers by showing that they had a good GPA in their education coursework and have good references from those under whom they student taught. If that's not lowering the standards, I don't know what is.
The bill was authored by Rep. Vernon Smith (D-Gary), who complained after the veto that the governor hadn't met with him to discuss the bill. I don't blame the governor. He has better things to do than argue about pointless bills. I can understand why Rep. Smith wants the bill: Gary schools are a dismal failure, and they can't get teachers to teach there. He probably thinks that lowering the standards of licensing will mean more teachers in Gary. Well, Mr. Smith, even if your plan worked, it wouldn't improve the education quality in Gary. You need qualified, talented, devoted teachers to come to Gary, not the people who couldn't pass the test. A better plan would be to pay teachers better.
In other news, a student at UVa-Wisa was expelled because of prose he composed in a creative writing class. His story involved a student who dreams of killing his professor and commits suicide. Okay, maybe I could see some threat here, but you need to consider the context. Nevermind that this is a creative writing class, and creativity doesn't always fit nicely into a pre-approved box. The student is an Iraqi war veteran with no history of mental illness and medals for good conduct. In fact, the school couldn't put together a case, except for the fact that the student had a few guns in his car. Okay, again, maybe I could see some threat here, but consider that he had a right to carry them, as he had permits for each of them. And he's a war veteran.
To make matters worse, the school involuntarily committed him for psychiatric testing, something that automatically revokes his ability to hold the gun permits. Well, that's one way to get around the law.
Eugene Volokh points out that "expulsion would still strike [him] an excessive remedy; nor would protecting the university from the possibility that he would turn into a Virginia-Tech-style mass killer justify this: If he really does plan to commit mass murder, he could do that as an expelled student pretty much as easily as an enrolled student (since the school doubtless doesn't have guards at each possible entrance to keep him off campus)."
I would love to use a case like this to get the issue of gun bans in schools brought before the Supreme Court. To me, it is ridiculous that a Constitutional right stops being a right when you cross an invisible barrier onto a campus. Only problem is that this case is not the one I'd bring up. Justice Scalia's son was the professor of that creative writing class. Scalia would have to take a breather on this case, which would leave us 4-4, which is unacceptable. On the plus side, such a lawsuit would encourage the legislators in Indianapolis to pass a bill allowing certain persons to carry firearms on campus.
Today's Indianapolis Star reports that Governor Daniels has used his first veto of this session, something he has done only seven times in office. I must say, he saved it for a good one. The bill: HEA 1210. The premise of the bill: allow a loophole for individuals who do not pass the teacher's licensing exam to still become teachers in Indiana. Easily one of the dumbest bills passed by the General Assembly this session.
Now, as anyone who has been reading this blog for a long time can tell you, I am no fan of public education. But if you're going to have public education, then it would best for your teachers to have some sort of standard. This bill would have allowed persons who fail the test to become teachers by showing that they had a good GPA in their education coursework and have good references from those under whom they student taught. If that's not lowering the standards, I don't know what is.
The bill was authored by Rep. Vernon Smith (D-Gary), who complained after the veto that the governor hadn't met with him to discuss the bill. I don't blame the governor. He has better things to do than argue about pointless bills. I can understand why Rep. Smith wants the bill: Gary schools are a dismal failure, and they can't get teachers to teach there. He probably thinks that lowering the standards of licensing will mean more teachers in Gary. Well, Mr. Smith, even if your plan worked, it wouldn't improve the education quality in Gary. You need qualified, talented, devoted teachers to come to Gary, not the people who couldn't pass the test. A better plan would be to pay teachers better.
In other news, a student at UVa-Wisa was expelled because of prose he composed in a creative writing class. His story involved a student who dreams of killing his professor and commits suicide. Okay, maybe I could see some threat here, but you need to consider the context. Nevermind that this is a creative writing class, and creativity doesn't always fit nicely into a pre-approved box. The student is an Iraqi war veteran with no history of mental illness and medals for good conduct. In fact, the school couldn't put together a case, except for the fact that the student had a few guns in his car. Okay, again, maybe I could see some threat here, but consider that he had a right to carry them, as he had permits for each of them. And he's a war veteran.
To make matters worse, the school involuntarily committed him for psychiatric testing, something that automatically revokes his ability to hold the gun permits. Well, that's one way to get around the law.
Eugene Volokh points out that "expulsion would still strike [him] an excessive remedy; nor would protecting the university from the possibility that he would turn into a Virginia-Tech-style mass killer justify this: If he really does plan to commit mass murder, he could do that as an expelled student pretty much as easily as an enrolled student (since the school doubtless doesn't have guards at each possible entrance to keep him off campus)."
I would love to use a case like this to get the issue of gun bans in schools brought before the Supreme Court. To me, it is ridiculous that a Constitutional right stops being a right when you cross an invisible barrier onto a campus. Only problem is that this case is not the one I'd bring up. Justice Scalia's son was the professor of that creative writing class. Scalia would have to take a breather on this case, which would leave us 4-4, which is unacceptable. On the plus side, such a lawsuit would encourage the legislators in Indianapolis to pass a bill allowing certain persons to carry firearms on campus.
1.16.2008
Is Amending the Constitution a Good Idea?
Last night I sat down to watch the State of the State address by Governor Daniels here in Indiana. I found myself pleased with the speech overall. He gave relatively few specific plans and instead acted as the cheerleader-in-chief (promoting Indiana's 8.5 minute transaction time at the BMV, or our declining unemployment rate surrounded by Midwest states who find theirs rising). However, he had to cover the property tax mess, and the way he did it got me thinking.
In his four step plan for solving the "property tax crisis" here in Indiana, he included an instruction that the general assembly should offer "permanent protection against the return of unaffordable taxes, though a permanent, constitutional cap of one percent of a home's value[.]" While I won't pass judgment on whether such a plan is good or not, it brings up the notion of amending the constitution. Ought the constitution be amended in such a way?
Black's calls a constitution "the fundamental and organic law of a nation or state that establishes the institutions and apparatus of government, defines the scope of governmental sovereign powers, and guarantees individual civil rights and civil liberties." Should a constitution then state the design of the General Assembly? Yes. Should a constitution state that the government can tax? Presumably. Should a constitution guarantee the right of citizens to bear arms? Yes. But should a constitution put a specific percentage cap on taxes, or force the Congress and the President to agree on a balanced budget (unless 3/5 of Congress vote to overspend), or to limit pardons between October 1 and January 21 of any presidential election year? Perhaps not.
Such things may be wonderful laws. I have no problem with a law saying that we ought to balance the budget. I have nothing against a law limiting taxes. But such things make for better laws than they do constitutional amendments. I understand that the idea of putting it into a constitution is to make it "permanent". I understand that putting things in a constitution automatically makes them "constitutional" and thus impossible to overturn in the courts. But does such technical verbiage about the operation of government belong in a document ensuring us fundamental rights and powers?
Chief Justice John Marshall didn't seem to think so. In McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 4 L.Ed. 579 (1819), Marshall discusses whether all the powers of the government ought to be found in the Constitution. "A constitution," he writes, "to contain an accurate detail of all the subdivisions of which its great powers will admit, and of all the means by which they may be carried into execution, would partake of the prolixity of a legal code, and could scarcely be embraced by the human mind. It would probably never be understood by the public. [W]e must never forget that it is a constitution we are expounding."
I couldn't agree more with Marshall. Our goal ought to be to have a constitution that the average citizen can read and understand. To weigh it down with tax brackets, definitions of marriage, requirements of "moments of silence", or any other frivolous notion that could pass in a generation is to dilute the meaning of a constitution as a general document putting forth general principles upon which we can build interpretations and legal reasoning.
So, with all due respect to our great Governor and the various representatives, both in Indianapolis and in Washington, D.C.: keep your hands off my Constitution.
In his four step plan for solving the "property tax crisis" here in Indiana, he included an instruction that the general assembly should offer "permanent protection against the return of unaffordable taxes, though a permanent, constitutional cap of one percent of a home's value[.]" While I won't pass judgment on whether such a plan is good or not, it brings up the notion of amending the constitution. Ought the constitution be amended in such a way?
Black's calls a constitution "the fundamental and organic law of a nation or state that establishes the institutions and apparatus of government, defines the scope of governmental sovereign powers, and guarantees individual civil rights and civil liberties." Should a constitution then state the design of the General Assembly? Yes. Should a constitution state that the government can tax? Presumably. Should a constitution guarantee the right of citizens to bear arms? Yes. But should a constitution put a specific percentage cap on taxes, or force the Congress and the President to agree on a balanced budget (unless 3/5 of Congress vote to overspend), or to limit pardons between October 1 and January 21 of any presidential election year? Perhaps not.
Such things may be wonderful laws. I have no problem with a law saying that we ought to balance the budget. I have nothing against a law limiting taxes. But such things make for better laws than they do constitutional amendments. I understand that the idea of putting it into a constitution is to make it "permanent". I understand that putting things in a constitution automatically makes them "constitutional" and thus impossible to overturn in the courts. But does such technical verbiage about the operation of government belong in a document ensuring us fundamental rights and powers?
Chief Justice John Marshall didn't seem to think so. In McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 4 L.Ed. 579 (1819), Marshall discusses whether all the powers of the government ought to be found in the Constitution. "A constitution," he writes, "to contain an accurate detail of all the subdivisions of which its great powers will admit, and of all the means by which they may be carried into execution, would partake of the prolixity of a legal code, and could scarcely be embraced by the human mind. It would probably never be understood by the public. [W]e must never forget that it is a constitution we are expounding."
I couldn't agree more with Marshall. Our goal ought to be to have a constitution that the average citizen can read and understand. To weigh it down with tax brackets, definitions of marriage, requirements of "moments of silence", or any other frivolous notion that could pass in a generation is to dilute the meaning of a constitution as a general document putting forth general principles upon which we can build interpretations and legal reasoning.
So, with all due respect to our great Governor and the various representatives, both in Indianapolis and in Washington, D.C.: keep your hands off my Constitution.
11.20.2007
"Oeniphiles Rejoice" Redux
On August 29, I posted a story about Professor Pat Baude's victory in an Indiana wine shipping case. The case was decided by Judge John Tinder, an Indiana Law alumni and District Court judge.
The state of Indiana is appealing the decision to the Seventh Circuit (see briefs here). In a delightful turn of fate, Judge Tinder is awaiting Senate confirmation for his appointment to that court.
On a side note, I usually like what my state is doing. But in this case, I certainly hope that Indiana fails. Professor Baude et al are representing the freedoms of Hoosiers. Fortunately, the Seventh Circuit is fairly libertarian, and hopefully will affirm the decision of its future comrade.
The state of Indiana is appealing the decision to the Seventh Circuit (see briefs here). In a delightful turn of fate, Judge Tinder is awaiting Senate confirmation for his appointment to that court.
On a side note, I usually like what my state is doing. But in this case, I certainly hope that Indiana fails. Professor Baude et al are representing the freedoms of Hoosiers. Fortunately, the Seventh Circuit is fairly libertarian, and hopefully will affirm the decision of its future comrade.
7.09.2007
Magister rerum mens (Mind is the Master of Things)
The current discussion in class is Mens Rea. The concept of a guilty mind is one of the cornerstones of our criminal justice system. Mens rea accounts for free will; in essence, man is responsible for his actions because he chooses them. While it is not always so simple, crimes are punished, in part, based on the levels of intent.
Aside from the usual issues of general/specific intent and scenarios involving intoxication, modern neuroscience is changing the way we look at human behavior, and thus, how we should punish wrong doing. This article in the New York Times magazine discusses some of the impact of brain-monitoring technology on the judicial process.
Generally speaking, there are two issues with using such technology. First, should we allow biological deficiencies as a defense against crimes? Second, should we use this technology to "predict" who is more likely to commit crimes? The article does a good job covering these issues, but I'd like to discuss a couple points in regards to the concept of mens rea in criminal law.
Under the Model Penal Code, there are generally no strict liability crimes. A crime always requires some guilty mind. This means having one of four mental states: purpose, knowledge, recklessness, or negligence. If a defendant has a growth on his prefrontal cortex that causes him to act in a way that is criminal, should we hold him accountable? Perhaps he knows the difference between right and wrong, yet still pushes someone down a flight of stairs. With fMRI scans, among others, we can establish that the growth may cause anger or rage in response to certain stimuli. How would punishing the individual meet our purposes of punishment? While the goal of incapacitation would be met, we cannot "deter" an individual whose brain makes him commit a crime, and without surgery (and perhaps even with it) we cannot "reform" the individual. Yet a brain growth doesn't necessarily make one "insane" by our definitions. Further, wouldn't taking scans of a suspect's brain to determine their guilt in a crime be a violation of the ban on self-incrimination?
A striking second problem is that of holding individuals accountable for their predispositions. Let us suppose that we know that a growth in a particular area makes a person 1000x more likely to lose control of their rage and kill a person. Would it be fair to lock them up without an actus reus? If we punished thoughts, no man would be free. It leads to imagining horrible futures like that in Minority Report (don't get me started on how wrong punishing "precrime" would be).
I prefer the antiquated concept of free will. But modern science seems to be coming closer and closer to proving that free will is nothing but a combination of chemicals mixing in the right proportions at the right moments. In that sense, are any of us free at all?
Aside from the usual issues of general/specific intent and scenarios involving intoxication, modern neuroscience is changing the way we look at human behavior, and thus, how we should punish wrong doing. This article in the New York Times magazine discusses some of the impact of brain-monitoring technology on the judicial process.
Generally speaking, there are two issues with using such technology. First, should we allow biological deficiencies as a defense against crimes? Second, should we use this technology to "predict" who is more likely to commit crimes? The article does a good job covering these issues, but I'd like to discuss a couple points in regards to the concept of mens rea in criminal law.
Under the Model Penal Code, there are generally no strict liability crimes. A crime always requires some guilty mind. This means having one of four mental states: purpose, knowledge, recklessness, or negligence. If a defendant has a growth on his prefrontal cortex that causes him to act in a way that is criminal, should we hold him accountable? Perhaps he knows the difference between right and wrong, yet still pushes someone down a flight of stairs. With fMRI scans, among others, we can establish that the growth may cause anger or rage in response to certain stimuli. How would punishing the individual meet our purposes of punishment? While the goal of incapacitation would be met, we cannot "deter" an individual whose brain makes him commit a crime, and without surgery (and perhaps even with it) we cannot "reform" the individual. Yet a brain growth doesn't necessarily make one "insane" by our definitions. Further, wouldn't taking scans of a suspect's brain to determine their guilt in a crime be a violation of the ban on self-incrimination?
A striking second problem is that of holding individuals accountable for their predispositions. Let us suppose that we know that a growth in a particular area makes a person 1000x more likely to lose control of their rage and kill a person. Would it be fair to lock them up without an actus reus? If we punished thoughts, no man would be free. It leads to imagining horrible futures like that in Minority Report (don't get me started on how wrong punishing "precrime" would be).
I prefer the antiquated concept of free will. But modern science seems to be coming closer and closer to proving that free will is nothing but a combination of chemicals mixing in the right proportions at the right moments. In that sense, are any of us free at all?
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