Anyone that has read my post from last February regarding SJR7, the so-called "Indiana Gay Marriage Ban", knows how I feel about the bill. I think it is a broad overreaching of the state government into the private lives of individuals and an attempt to codify bigotry in our most important document. Those opposed to the thought of same-sex marriage can be comfortable that Indiana law still prevents the marriage or civil union of two persons of the same gender. A constitutional amendment is just one more way to ensure that future generations can't become less bigoted than the current one.
I applauded last year when the bill died in the House. But the bill has again passed the Senate, with a vote of 39-9 (practically the same as last year). The bill is stalled in the House, and it looks ready to die at the hands of House Democrats again. That is, unless Rep. Eric Turner (R-Marion) has his way, and manages to have it attached to the same bill capping property taxes. That just shows the shady dealings that go on in politics: attaching a frivolous and hateful bill to one for which the people are desperately crying out.
The arguments for this ban are same arguments we heard for decades regarding interracial marriage. Anti-miscegenation laws were in place since the beginnings of this nation, often appearing in state Constitutions. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), was the final nail in the coffin of those racist laws. There, the Supreme Court reversed a trial judge's decision that a black woman and white man could not enter the state without being subject to arrest. The trial judge showed his true colors when he stated, "Almighty God created the races white, black, yellow, and red, and he placed them on separate continents. And but for the interference with his arrangement there would be no cause for such marriages. The fact that he separated the races shows that he did not intend for the races to mix." Id. at 3. In other words, interracial marriage was "unnatural." This argument sounds familiar.
It took 103 years, but South Carolina finally removed the prohibition on "marriage of a white person with a Negro or mulatto or a person who shall have one-eighth or more of Negro blood" from its Constitution in 1998. How sad that such bigotry was written into a Constitution for so long. It casts a shadow of shame on the people of the state. Now Indiana wants to do the same.
If the state wants to ban gay marriage in statutes, and that is the will of the people, so be it. Not all of us may agree, but such is the way of politics and legislation. As I stated in my previous post, amending the Constitution really is not something we should do lightly. And besides, haven't we got more important bill to pass right now?
1.28.2008
Ought the law feel?
In property, we began discussing property rights in the human body, and had a bit of a debate about whether a person should be able to sell their own body parts. I was one of the few on the side of the right to do so. I should note that I believe there are two restrictions on that right: 1) that no person under 18 should have parts sold (either by their own choice or by that of their parents); and 2) that no person should be able to sell an essential body part while still alive. The first restriction prevents the possibility (horrible though it may be) that impoverished persons would have children solely to "part them out". The second restriction prevents one person giving their life for another. All well-and-good to sell blood, or bone marrow, or a kidney. Not okay to sell your heart or stomach.*
While some of the opponents relied on reasonable (though in my opinion, wrong) arguments as to why we should not be allowed to sell body parts, others did not. The concept that such a system would unfairly punish the poor is reasonable. The concept that it could bring about a black market in human organs is reasonable (though, as I pointed out, there is already a $1 billion-a-year black market in organs harvested illegally). The concept that it would make the recipients feel guilt is not reasonable.
That concept was brought up by a good friend of mine. A family member received a heart transplant some time ago, and as a result, she has deep feelings about the right to sell body parts. She feels that the law should prevent selling organs because the recipients would feel guilt about having the life of one individual sacrificed for another (i.e. the recipient of a heart would know that a person died to give him that heart). Let's forget my second qualifier on the right for the moment (that is, that no living person could donate a heart while still alive).
Should the law deal with emotions, sympathy, or empathy? Does such thinking prevent real legal analysis? I tend to believe that emotions have no place in the law. No matter what case you look at, there is an emotional appeal. Every murderer has a mother. Every house has a history. Even suing a cigarette company could become emotional because you are lower the stock price of retired persons who have savings in safe companies like Altria. But these are irrelevant. They only cloud the true legal questions.
The virtue of the law is that it is neutral, that it relies on logic and reason. It does not waver in the winds of poll data. While the emotions may help to ferret out good reasons in an argument, I am of the opinion that they should not, in and of themselves, be arguments.
I would like to hear other opinions on the matter. Should emotions have a place in the law? If you believe so, how can you get around the problems that such emotions place in the debate?
*I will save the greater debate on property rights in the body for another time. Trust me, I'll be back with data points and everything else you could want in such a discussion. But that is beside the point of this post.
While some of the opponents relied on reasonable (though in my opinion, wrong) arguments as to why we should not be allowed to sell body parts, others did not. The concept that such a system would unfairly punish the poor is reasonable. The concept that it could bring about a black market in human organs is reasonable (though, as I pointed out, there is already a $1 billion-a-year black market in organs harvested illegally). The concept that it would make the recipients feel guilt is not reasonable.
That concept was brought up by a good friend of mine. A family member received a heart transplant some time ago, and as a result, she has deep feelings about the right to sell body parts. She feels that the law should prevent selling organs because the recipients would feel guilt about having the life of one individual sacrificed for another (i.e. the recipient of a heart would know that a person died to give him that heart). Let's forget my second qualifier on the right for the moment (that is, that no living person could donate a heart while still alive).
Should the law deal with emotions, sympathy, or empathy? Does such thinking prevent real legal analysis? I tend to believe that emotions have no place in the law. No matter what case you look at, there is an emotional appeal. Every murderer has a mother. Every house has a history. Even suing a cigarette company could become emotional because you are lower the stock price of retired persons who have savings in safe companies like Altria. But these are irrelevant. They only cloud the true legal questions.
The virtue of the law is that it is neutral, that it relies on logic and reason. It does not waver in the winds of poll data. While the emotions may help to ferret out good reasons in an argument, I am of the opinion that they should not, in and of themselves, be arguments.
I would like to hear other opinions on the matter. Should emotions have a place in the law? If you believe so, how can you get around the problems that such emotions place in the debate?
*I will save the greater debate on property rights in the body for another time. Trust me, I'll be back with data points and everything else you could want in such a discussion. But that is beside the point of this post.
1.16.2008
Is Amending the Constitution a Good Idea?
Last night I sat down to watch the State of the State address by Governor Daniels here in Indiana. I found myself pleased with the speech overall. He gave relatively few specific plans and instead acted as the cheerleader-in-chief (promoting Indiana's 8.5 minute transaction time at the BMV, or our declining unemployment rate surrounded by Midwest states who find theirs rising). However, he had to cover the property tax mess, and the way he did it got me thinking.
In his four step plan for solving the "property tax crisis" here in Indiana, he included an instruction that the general assembly should offer "permanent protection against the return of unaffordable taxes, though a permanent, constitutional cap of one percent of a home's value[.]" While I won't pass judgment on whether such a plan is good or not, it brings up the notion of amending the constitution. Ought the constitution be amended in such a way?
Black's calls a constitution "the fundamental and organic law of a nation or state that establishes the institutions and apparatus of government, defines the scope of governmental sovereign powers, and guarantees individual civil rights and civil liberties." Should a constitution then state the design of the General Assembly? Yes. Should a constitution state that the government can tax? Presumably. Should a constitution guarantee the right of citizens to bear arms? Yes. But should a constitution put a specific percentage cap on taxes, or force the Congress and the President to agree on a balanced budget (unless 3/5 of Congress vote to overspend), or to limit pardons between October 1 and January 21 of any presidential election year? Perhaps not.
Such things may be wonderful laws. I have no problem with a law saying that we ought to balance the budget. I have nothing against a law limiting taxes. But such things make for better laws than they do constitutional amendments. I understand that the idea of putting it into a constitution is to make it "permanent". I understand that putting things in a constitution automatically makes them "constitutional" and thus impossible to overturn in the courts. But does such technical verbiage about the operation of government belong in a document ensuring us fundamental rights and powers?
Chief Justice John Marshall didn't seem to think so. In McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 4 L.Ed. 579 (1819), Marshall discusses whether all the powers of the government ought to be found in the Constitution. "A constitution," he writes, "to contain an accurate detail of all the subdivisions of which its great powers will admit, and of all the means by which they may be carried into execution, would partake of the prolixity of a legal code, and could scarcely be embraced by the human mind. It would probably never be understood by the public. [W]e must never forget that it is a constitution we are expounding."
I couldn't agree more with Marshall. Our goal ought to be to have a constitution that the average citizen can read and understand. To weigh it down with tax brackets, definitions of marriage, requirements of "moments of silence", or any other frivolous notion that could pass in a generation is to dilute the meaning of a constitution as a general document putting forth general principles upon which we can build interpretations and legal reasoning.
So, with all due respect to our great Governor and the various representatives, both in Indianapolis and in Washington, D.C.: keep your hands off my Constitution.
In his four step plan for solving the "property tax crisis" here in Indiana, he included an instruction that the general assembly should offer "permanent protection against the return of unaffordable taxes, though a permanent, constitutional cap of one percent of a home's value[.]" While I won't pass judgment on whether such a plan is good or not, it brings up the notion of amending the constitution. Ought the constitution be amended in such a way?
Black's calls a constitution "the fundamental and organic law of a nation or state that establishes the institutions and apparatus of government, defines the scope of governmental sovereign powers, and guarantees individual civil rights and civil liberties." Should a constitution then state the design of the General Assembly? Yes. Should a constitution state that the government can tax? Presumably. Should a constitution guarantee the right of citizens to bear arms? Yes. But should a constitution put a specific percentage cap on taxes, or force the Congress and the President to agree on a balanced budget (unless 3/5 of Congress vote to overspend), or to limit pardons between October 1 and January 21 of any presidential election year? Perhaps not.
Such things may be wonderful laws. I have no problem with a law saying that we ought to balance the budget. I have nothing against a law limiting taxes. But such things make for better laws than they do constitutional amendments. I understand that the idea of putting it into a constitution is to make it "permanent". I understand that putting things in a constitution automatically makes them "constitutional" and thus impossible to overturn in the courts. But does such technical verbiage about the operation of government belong in a document ensuring us fundamental rights and powers?
Chief Justice John Marshall didn't seem to think so. In McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 4 L.Ed. 579 (1819), Marshall discusses whether all the powers of the government ought to be found in the Constitution. "A constitution," he writes, "to contain an accurate detail of all the subdivisions of which its great powers will admit, and of all the means by which they may be carried into execution, would partake of the prolixity of a legal code, and could scarcely be embraced by the human mind. It would probably never be understood by the public. [W]e must never forget that it is a constitution we are expounding."
I couldn't agree more with Marshall. Our goal ought to be to have a constitution that the average citizen can read and understand. To weigh it down with tax brackets, definitions of marriage, requirements of "moments of silence", or any other frivolous notion that could pass in a generation is to dilute the meaning of a constitution as a general document putting forth general principles upon which we can build interpretations and legal reasoning.
So, with all due respect to our great Governor and the various representatives, both in Indianapolis and in Washington, D.C.: keep your hands off my Constitution.
1.15.2008
2008 General Assembly Series: SB47 and the Request for Death
It is my favorite time of the year. Not because I like snow or the cold, or because I enjoy the post-Christmas atmosphere. No, this is my favorite time of year because our fine legislators here in Indiana have the opportunity to meet for their short annual session. I'm not entirely sure why I enjoy the General Assembly so much, but I think it has everything to do with my interest in politics and law, my inspired admiration of federalism, and the sheer history in those two chambers in Indianapolis.
As part of this year's General Assembly Series, I wanted to take a closer look at some of the proposed bills that our elected representatives have put forth as being the will of the people. This series will run over the next week or two, and will give me a chance to inform the public about some of the laws being debated.
One of the more interesting proposed bills this session is Senate Bill 0047, authored by Senator Waterman (R, Dist. 39) and now before the Committee on the Judiciary for its first reading. The bill would allow certain incarcerated persons who have been sentenced to: (1) at least 200 years imprisonment; (2) an executed sentence of life imprisonment; or (3) life imprisonment without parole; to request the imposition of a death sentence. Individuals requesting the sentence would be interviewed by a psychologist or psychiatrist to determine whether the person understands the proceedings, is mentally ill or has mental retardation (as defined in IC 35-36-9-2), and whether the person has attempted suicide, among other things. Should they have a change of heart, the incarcerated person has the authority suspend execution and reinstate the original sentence.
While evaluating this bill, we ought to consider three major points: the cost comparison for the taxpayers of the two options, the Constitutionality of the bill, and whether this is a fair punishment in the eyes of the victims.
Many studies suggest that the actual cost of imposing the death penalty is higher than putting a person in prison for life. The Indiana Criminal Justice Institute notes that the major reason that is true is that "[in] Indiana[,] capital cases are more extensively litigated than other murder cases… When the ultimate penalty is at stake, litigation moves into a 'super due process' mode that goes above and beyond the due process invoked by a potential term of years." Goodpaster, Cost Comparison between a Death Penalty Case and a Case Where the Charge and Conviction is Life without Parole, The Application of Indiana's Capital Sentencing Law: Findings of the Indiana Criminal Law Study Commission, 2002, at 122A. The report states that the death penalty costs exceed "life without parole" costs by 34% to 37%. Id. But for cases covered under the new law, the cost of the original trial would be the same as any other non-capital offense.
Admittedly, the cost of the court hearing and psychological testing would drive up the cost of the death penalty. However, the individual would not use prison (and thus taxpayer) resources for the remainder of their life. The report puts the estimated time on death row at 10.5 years, and the average stay for LWOP at 30-40 years. Id at 122E. Further, the report puts the cost of health care for aging prisoners at over $6000 per year. Id at 122D. Assuming that the person elected to have the death penalty shortly after their sentencing, and that the psychological screening took only a short while, the incarcerated person could potentially have received death within one to two years. Compared to thirty years, the taxpayers are saving quite a bit of money. Even if the individual waits five years (and all possible appeals), the turnaround under this bill would be so quick that there would not be a 10.5 year wait for death. Purely economically, incarcerated persons electing the death penalty could save Hoosier taxpayers thousands, while freeing needed space in our already overcrowded prisons.
Of course the major concern ought to be the constitutionality of the bill, both in the Indiana and U.S. Constitutions. After all, a jury of his or her peers found only that the incarcerated ought to be in prison for life, not that he or she ought to be executed. To punish a person more than a jury saw fit might be considered cruel or unusual. I sought comparable laws in other states, but it seems that Indiana is the first to propose one. As such, no such law has been tested by any court for its constitutionality. Some states do allow death row inmates to choose their method of execution, and this has been found to be constitutional. Looking purely at the language of the Constitution, it would seem that the voluntary election of the death penalty can hardly be considered cruel, since the incarcerated is putting the punishment onto himself. Can one be cruel to oneself? Yes, but people with such tendencies would likely be ruled out through the psychological exam. I would tend to believe that such a law is constitutional, but without precedent to guide me, it is frankly a shot in the dark.
Perhaps the concern that some taxpayers and believers in punishment will have is the concern that choosing the death penalty is a cop out. I tend to agree with this view. It is much easier for a person to elect death than to sit in a cell thinking about their crimes, their solitude. Just as we tend to call suicide "the coward's way out," allowing a needle into your arm (should our honorable Supreme Court hold needles still uncruel and usual) could be called cowardly. Passing such a law could be seen as weak on crime.
On the other hand, one of the primary concerns with the death penalty is that it kills innocent people. Yes, without a doubt innocent people have been sentenced to death. However, I cannot believe that an innocent person would elect to choose death, and thus the law would have 100% accuracy. An innocent person clings to hope, believing that they will one day be vindicated and set free. Even those who lose hope couldn't pass the psychological exam, because "I've lost hope" hardly qualifies as a reason to elect death.
I certainly am not suggesting that I like or dislike the law. I think it is inventive, and certainly worth looking at. I simply hope that the Judicial Committee, and eventually the General Assembly, will consider these points as they debate the purpose, wording, and efficacy of this bill.
As part of this year's General Assembly Series, I wanted to take a closer look at some of the proposed bills that our elected representatives have put forth as being the will of the people. This series will run over the next week or two, and will give me a chance to inform the public about some of the laws being debated.
One of the more interesting proposed bills this session is Senate Bill 0047, authored by Senator Waterman (R, Dist. 39) and now before the Committee on the Judiciary for its first reading. The bill would allow certain incarcerated persons who have been sentenced to: (1) at least 200 years imprisonment; (2) an executed sentence of life imprisonment; or (3) life imprisonment without parole; to request the imposition of a death sentence. Individuals requesting the sentence would be interviewed by a psychologist or psychiatrist to determine whether the person understands the proceedings, is mentally ill or has mental retardation (as defined in IC 35-36-9-2), and whether the person has attempted suicide, among other things. Should they have a change of heart, the incarcerated person has the authority suspend execution and reinstate the original sentence.
While evaluating this bill, we ought to consider three major points: the cost comparison for the taxpayers of the two options, the Constitutionality of the bill, and whether this is a fair punishment in the eyes of the victims.
Many studies suggest that the actual cost of imposing the death penalty is higher than putting a person in prison for life. The Indiana Criminal Justice Institute notes that the major reason that is true is that "[in] Indiana[,] capital cases are more extensively litigated than other murder cases… When the ultimate penalty is at stake, litigation moves into a 'super due process' mode that goes above and beyond the due process invoked by a potential term of years." Goodpaster, Cost Comparison between a Death Penalty Case and a Case Where the Charge and Conviction is Life without Parole, The Application of Indiana's Capital Sentencing Law: Findings of the Indiana Criminal Law Study Commission, 2002, at 122A. The report states that the death penalty costs exceed "life without parole" costs by 34% to 37%. Id. But for cases covered under the new law, the cost of the original trial would be the same as any other non-capital offense.
Admittedly, the cost of the court hearing and psychological testing would drive up the cost of the death penalty. However, the individual would not use prison (and thus taxpayer) resources for the remainder of their life. The report puts the estimated time on death row at 10.5 years, and the average stay for LWOP at 30-40 years. Id at 122E. Further, the report puts the cost of health care for aging prisoners at over $6000 per year. Id at 122D. Assuming that the person elected to have the death penalty shortly after their sentencing, and that the psychological screening took only a short while, the incarcerated person could potentially have received death within one to two years. Compared to thirty years, the taxpayers are saving quite a bit of money. Even if the individual waits five years (and all possible appeals), the turnaround under this bill would be so quick that there would not be a 10.5 year wait for death. Purely economically, incarcerated persons electing the death penalty could save Hoosier taxpayers thousands, while freeing needed space in our already overcrowded prisons.
Of course the major concern ought to be the constitutionality of the bill, both in the Indiana and U.S. Constitutions. After all, a jury of his or her peers found only that the incarcerated ought to be in prison for life, not that he or she ought to be executed. To punish a person more than a jury saw fit might be considered cruel or unusual. I sought comparable laws in other states, but it seems that Indiana is the first to propose one. As such, no such law has been tested by any court for its constitutionality. Some states do allow death row inmates to choose their method of execution, and this has been found to be constitutional. Looking purely at the language of the Constitution, it would seem that the voluntary election of the death penalty can hardly be considered cruel, since the incarcerated is putting the punishment onto himself. Can one be cruel to oneself? Yes, but people with such tendencies would likely be ruled out through the psychological exam. I would tend to believe that such a law is constitutional, but without precedent to guide me, it is frankly a shot in the dark.
Perhaps the concern that some taxpayers and believers in punishment will have is the concern that choosing the death penalty is a cop out. I tend to agree with this view. It is much easier for a person to elect death than to sit in a cell thinking about their crimes, their solitude. Just as we tend to call suicide "the coward's way out," allowing a needle into your arm (should our honorable Supreme Court hold needles still uncruel and usual) could be called cowardly. Passing such a law could be seen as weak on crime.
On the other hand, one of the primary concerns with the death penalty is that it kills innocent people. Yes, without a doubt innocent people have been sentenced to death. However, I cannot believe that an innocent person would elect to choose death, and thus the law would have 100% accuracy. An innocent person clings to hope, believing that they will one day be vindicated and set free. Even those who lose hope couldn't pass the psychological exam, because "I've lost hope" hardly qualifies as a reason to elect death.
I certainly am not suggesting that I like or dislike the law. I think it is inventive, and certainly worth looking at. I simply hope that the Judicial Committee, and eventually the General Assembly, will consider these points as they debate the purpose, wording, and efficacy of this bill.
1.10.2008
Back at It
After a long delay for Christmas break, and a warm vacation in Arizona, I am back to post. I would have posted over break, but, to be honest, I was enjoying relaxation and working on getting out résumés for this summer. I spread my net wide, and hopefully my undergraduate record will help me get a few interviews. Several federal agencies received my information, as did a few firms in Indianapolis. I am hoping that I can find a paying job, but I won't be holding my breath.
I am particularly excited by my schedule this semester. Not that there was anything wrong with my schedule last semester, but rather than Ethics and Torts, I get libertarian lovables Property and Constitutional Law. Further, we get into advocacy in Legal Research and Writing, which I think is my strength. I found it difficult to write completely neutrally last semester, and the opportunity to practice oral advocacy will lend itself well to whatever is in my future.
I am keeping up with the election coverage, but I won't get political here other than to say that the candidate I support is gathering far more votes than the "mainstream media" believed he would. Hopefully he will make a splash in Michigan, where he was running ads in Arabic to the Muslim communities there. I was disappointed to see Bill Richardson drop out of the race, since I believed he was the Democrat most qualified to be President, and a man who developed far more innovative solutions to problems (boycotting the Beijing Olympics to put pressure on China to get involved in Africa, for example). He should have gotten more votes, but apparently he wasn't liberal enough to win in the primaries. He also didn't say the words "change" or "hope" enough on stage. C'est la vie.
I am particularly excited by my schedule this semester. Not that there was anything wrong with my schedule last semester, but rather than Ethics and Torts, I get libertarian lovables Property and Constitutional Law. Further, we get into advocacy in Legal Research and Writing, which I think is my strength. I found it difficult to write completely neutrally last semester, and the opportunity to practice oral advocacy will lend itself well to whatever is in my future.
I am keeping up with the election coverage, but I won't get political here other than to say that the candidate I support is gathering far more votes than the "mainstream media" believed he would. Hopefully he will make a splash in Michigan, where he was running ads in Arabic to the Muslim communities there. I was disappointed to see Bill Richardson drop out of the race, since I believed he was the Democrat most qualified to be President, and a man who developed far more innovative solutions to problems (boycotting the Beijing Olympics to put pressure on China to get involved in Africa, for example). He should have gotten more votes, but apparently he wasn't liberal enough to win in the primaries. He also didn't say the words "change" or "hope" enough on stage. C'est la vie.
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